Dutch Present-Day Society: second assignment
Pillarization and depillarization in the Netherlands
A key concept in the development of the Dutch society in the 20th century is the so-called ‘pillarization’ (or ‘verzuiling’ in Dutch), i.e. a ‘phenomenon of social and political organization around an ideology within the nation state’ (Bax 1995: 7). However, this system gradually declined, leading to ‘depillarization’ from the end of the 1970s onwards, although some of its effects are still visible, e.g. in the education system (Besamusca 2008). In order to get a better insight of the Dutch present-day society we will notably discuss the phenomenon (its development and the various scholarly approaches), and evaluate its positive and negative aspects.
Lijphart made one of the earliest attempts to show evidence of that phenomenon. He describes pillars as ‘subcultural social groups’ based on religious affiliation and/or ideology (Catholics, Calvinists or seculars, the latter consisting of Socialists and Liberals) (Lijphart 1968: 16-17). Each pillar (or ‘bloc’) had its own political parties, interest groups, as well as infrastructures in domains such as the media, health care and leisure and education, among others (Bardoel 2003: 81). Moreover, each of these organized social subcultures interfered in numerous aspects of people’s lives, the Catholic pillar having the most comprehensive infrastructure (Andeweg & Irwin 2002: 23). Moreover, these structures aim for ‘autarchy or self-sufficiency’ and thus they integrate people on a vertical basis, rather than horizontally as social classes do (Dobbelaere 2000: 181-182). Bax (1995: 8) also argued that all this was made possible for each pillar thanks to a shared ideology to compete but also cooperate with other groups, thanks to the mediation of the elites.
The exact number of pillars is subject to much discussion. Lijphart identifies different numbers of blocs, depending on the criteria. Indeed, as mentioned above he distinguishes a basic fourfold division from which we can highlight five political parties (1968: 24), but only three labor union federations (1968: 36); he considers these dimensions to be less relevant than the religious-ideological one. Andeweg & Irwin also support a fourfold division, but do not regroup the Socialists and the Liberals under ‘seculars’, because the liberals ‘form[ed] a pillar only by default’ (2002: 25). Finally, Van Holstein and Irwin argue that religion and social class ‘produced five groups in society’ because they attribute a pillar to both the Dutch Reformed and the Calvinists, as well as to the Catholics, Socialists and Liberals (2003: 48).
According to Lijphart (1968: 17) pillarization finds its roots in the 16th century during the Catholic-Protestant conflict with Spain, but the three main blocs appeared later and organized their network, and the secular pillar was split by class differences (1968: 23). He also maintains that pillarization increased after 1917 (Andeweg & Irwin 2003: 32). Bax does not deny early roots of pillarization during the war against Spain with the creation of a culture of ‘Living-Apart-Together’ (LAT). However, he sees the real beginning of pillarization in the birth of new ideologies in the late 19th century, resulting in an institutionalization of pluralism in order to manage minorities, although the degree and tempo of pillarization varied (1995: 2-6, 36). Dobbelaere (2000: 182) presents three scholars’ theories that could explain the advent of pillarization: the emancipation, political mobilization and preservation hypotheses. While each of them do not help explain everything, they illustrate the fact that there were different reasons for creating pillars and not just one (Besamusca 2008).
Although there was a willingness to renew Dutch politics after the Second World War, changes only took place from the second half of the 1960s onwards (Andeweg & Irwin 2003: 26, 34-36): depillarization started, diminishing the role of ideology and the pillar cohesiveness, and making different groups merge (Spiecker & Steutel 2001: 295). The ‘spirit of the 60s’ (e.g. hippies and other politico-social movements) and the decline of ideologies accelerated the process (Besamusca 2008). However, depillarization did not have the same extent in all domains. For instance, the original pillar-rooted channels still exist, but individualism has overthrown collectivism, hence the search for a general ‘media culture’ as a debate place (Bardoel 2003: 84). Bax also considers the 1960s as the beginning of depillarization, with an exceptional level of economic growth that strengthened the welfare state. As people less relied on other institutions, it led the ‘Dutch consensus society into the direction of a class society’ (1995: 3, 12).
Some apparently negative aspects of pillarization were that it could cause ‘exclusiveness and an in-group mentality’ (Dobbelaere 2000: 182) and was a tool of minority management to keep control over the plural society (Bax 1995: 3, 8), thus a combination of autonomy of the different social groups and their integration in the state framework. However, while pillarization could be seen as a threat to stable government, it is actually a factor of ‘consociational democracy’: Lijphart argues that there is competition between the elites of the different pillars, but they cooperate by respecting four basic principles thanks to which standstills on (polemical) issues could be avoided, in the frame of ‘politics of accommodation’ — which are still continued today, since majority cannot be reached by a single party (Andeweg & Irwin 2003: 27-29, 42). Besides, voters have become more volatile, which notably caused the Christians’ defeat in 1994, resulting in a ‘purple’ coalition that made considerable advances in controversial issues such as euthanasia (Besamusca 2008). Moreover, pillarization enabled group emancipation and prevented class cleavages because the vertical, ideological dimension was dominant. The LAT-culture was another factor to promote cohabitation between minorities (Bax 1995: 10). Finally, Spiecker & Steutel (2001: 292) argued that the Dutch society changed into a multi-ethnic state. The crucial question now is whether the new minorities (such as Muslims) will aim for emancipation through a process of re-pillarization.
Sources• ANDEWEG, R. B. & G.A. IRWIN (2002). Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Basingstroke. Chapter 2, pp. 17-42.
• BARDOEL, J. (2003). ‘Back to the public? Accessing public broadcasting in the Netherlands.’ In: The Public, vol. 10 (2003), no. 3, pp. 81-96.
• BAX, E.H. (1995). Cleavage in Dutch Society: Changing Patterns of Social and Economic Discrimination, pp. 1-12. Paper presented at the Conference on Political, Economic and Social Racism, Thessaloniki, Macedonia, Greece, May 14-18, 1995.
• BESAMUSCA, E. (2008). Pillarization and De-pillarization: an overview of the 20th century. Dutch Present-Day Society lecture, Utrecht, Netherlands, September 26, 2008.
• DOBBELAERE, K. (2000). ‘The Rationale of Pillarization: The Case of Minority Movements’. In: Journal of Contemporary Religion, vol. 15, no. 2, 2000, pp. 181-183.
• HOLSTEYN, J.J.M. VAN & G.A. IRWIN (2003). ‘Never a Dull Moment: Pim Fortuyn and the Dutch Parliamentary Election of 2002’. In: West European Politics, vol. 26, no. 2 (April 2003), pp. 41-66.
• LIJPHART, A. (1968). The politics of accommodation. Pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley etc. Chapter 2, pp. 16-58.
• SPIECKER B. & J. STEUTEL (2001). ‘Multiculturalism, pillarization and liberal civic education in the Netherlands.’ In: International Journal of Educational Research, no. 35 (2001), pp. 292-295.
3 comments:
Congratulations! I got an 8 myself, and I'm pretty happy as well :)
Very well done, you two! Congratulations, Hut ab...
Thanks! And congrats to you, Aslak! Two more essays are coming, but those good grades are definitely encouraging.
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